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Death by Birth
Alastair Hunt
Portland State University

Thou wast not born for death, immortal Bird!
No hungry generations tread thee down.
John Keats
“Ode to a Nightingale”

Red meat takes years off of cow’s life1

American political scientist Timothy Pachirat’s recent book, Every Twelve
Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (2011), begins
with death.
In 2004, six cattle escaped from the holding pen of an industrialized slaughterhouse in Omaha, Nebraska. According to the
Omaha World Herald, which featured the story on its front
page, four of the six cattle made an immediate run for the parking lot of nearby Saint Francis of Assisi Catholic Church, where
they were recaptured and transported back to be slaughtered.
1 Just to be safe, I should point out that The Onion, from which I quote this news
article headline, is a satirical newspaper.

ESC 39.1 (March 2013): 97–124

Alastair Hunt is
Assistant Professor in
the English Department
at Portland State
University in Oregon,
where he teaches British
romanticism, critical
theory, and animal
studies. He has published
articles on Friedrich
Schlegel, Hannah Arendt,
and Paul de Man. He is
co-editor of the essay
collection Romanticism
and Biopolitics (a
special issue of
Romantic Circles Praxis,
December 2012). He is
currently completing a
manuscript titled Rights
of Romanticism.

A fifth animal trotted down a main boulevard to the railroad
yards that used to service Omaha’s once-booming stockyards.
The sixth, a cream-colored cow, accompanied the fifth animal
partway before turning into an alleyway leading to another
slaughterhouse. (1)
As you can probably guess, for the sixth cow—as for the five others—things
end badly. In the alleyway leading to the second slaughterhouse, police
shoot it multiple times with a shotgun, and then it dies. I borrow this story,
and so also begin with death, because it is the most economic way I can
think of to announce my opening point: being killed is a defining predicament of animals labouring in the commercial agricultural industry. Pachirat’s rendering of the story makes this point so efficiently and pointedly,
and in a manner not a little reminiscent of Kafka,2 in part simply because,
while the cows attempt to escape their institutional fate of being killed,
their efforts are in every case futile. The details of the futility underscore
the point. For instance, the irony of the fact that four of the cows effectively
seek, but fail to find, sanctuary in the parking lot of a church dedicated to
the Catholic patron saint of animals, and the images of the other two cows
wandering through an urban space, the construction and architecture of
which suggests that although they may have left one slaughterhouse, the
building apparently has no outside.
Companion animals, feral animals, and wild animals die in a variety of
ways. Some are killed by humans, some are killed by other animals, some
die of old age, disease, accident, and so on. The deaths of agricultural animals, however, almost always take the form of being killed. For such animal
labourers as beef cattle, domesticated pigs, and turkeys, as well as dairy
cows, breeding sows (female pigs), and egg-laying hens, the horizon of life
is not the multifarious forms of death that snare all mortal creatures. It is
a specific form of dying. This unique situation is accentuated by the fact
that nearly all such animals die in mechanized facilities in which massacre
and bureaucracy converge, facilities that have been called “machines for
dying in,”3 facilities designed solely for the purpose of killing animals and,
2 Pachirat’s story is reminiscent of a particular Kafka story, namely “A Little Fable,”

in which a mouse observes, “there in the corner stands the trap that I must run
into,” to which a cat responds, “You only need to change your direction,” before
eating the mouse (257). What’s really Kafkaesque about the story, however, is
that the animal protagonists are, as Maurice Blanchot argues so many of Kafka’s
protagonists are, effectively suspended between life and death.
3 In her introduction to Meat, Modernity, and the Rise of the Slaughterhouse,
Paula Young Lee coins the phrase by way of an arch reference to Le Corbusier’s
description of a house as “a machine for living in.”

98 | Hunt

afterwards, disarticulating their bodies into portions to be packaged and
sold as, for the most part, food for human beings.
To be sure, the sixth cow is killed at but not in such a facility and indeed
is part of a gang of cows that defer being killed through an escape, albeit
a temporary one.4 There are, moreover, a number of cases of animals
that successfully elude the institutionalized process of being killed that is
devised especially for them. In May 2011, for instance, a six-year-old dairy
cow called Yvonne, and slated to be transported to the slaughterhouse,
escaped from a farm near the town of Mühldorf in Bavaria, Germany, and
spent three months on the run before she was recaptured and bought by an
animal sanctuary. Indeed, one could even go so far as to say that Yvonne’s
adventure occasioned, as such stories routinely do, something like the
“wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm” that Immanuel
Kant affirmed as the proper affective response of contemporary spectators
of the French Revolution (“An Old Question Raised Again” 143–48). The
Süddeutsche Zeitung, for instance, called her “a sort of freedom fighter for
the animal-loving republic” (so etwas wie einer Freiheitsheldin für die tierliebe Republik) (Heidenreich). However, just as Kant ultimately denied those
subject to a sovereign power the right to revolution (“Towards Perpetual
Peace”), so the affective thrill over agricultural animal escapades exhibited
in the news article takes as its condition of possibility resignation to an
institutionalized capture of animal life so regularized it seems inexorable,
part of the order of things. More generally, the kind of affect on display
in this new story almost never turns into an ethico-political contention
that in any way questions if the fate designed for agricultural animals is
just.5 The number of agricultural animals killed as they are intended to be
simply dwarfs the number of those that go on any escapade, let alone those
who successfully escape being killed. Regardless of whether agricultural
animals die by being efficiently processed by professional slaughterhouse
workers or die in a more ad hoc manner, say, by being shot by police in
the alleyway leading to a slaughterhouse, I think no one, with perhaps the
exception of the animals themselves, really finds it a surprise that the dying
of agricultural animals with very few exceptions takes one specific form,
4 The non-instituted manner of the cow’s being killed is of key importance for

Pachirat, who retells the story. He suggests that it is the unplanned, anomalous
nature of the animal’s being killed that occasions in spectating workers at the
slaughterhouse the indignant affective response they normally do not experience
during their regular work killing animals and disarticulating their dead bodies.
5 For an incisive discussion of agricultural animal escapes, see Robert McKay.
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that of being killed.6 In a way, Martin Heidegger was, at least with regards
to the world of industrialized agriculture, spot on when he said, in Being
and Time, that animals do not properly speaking “die” but not quite right
when he said they merely “perish” (46–53).7 The truth is they are killed.
Pachirat’s story is the perfect opening to his book’s broad central and
convincing claim that what goes on in industrial slaughterhouses is only
possible because of the institutional organization of the sensory perception, affective responses, and critical thinking of both off-site consumers
of the slaughterhouse’s products and its on-site workers. “An examination of the everyday realities of contemporary slaughterhouse work,” he
contends, “illuminates not only the ways in which the slaughterhouse is
overtly segregated from society as a whole, but—paradoxically and perhaps more importantly—how the work of killing is hidden even from
those who participate directly in it” (8–9). To more fully explain how
the mass killing of agricultural animals is made acceptable, however, we
need to move beyond the scenography of the slaughterhouse so as to also
take into account the conditions of possibility in place before animals get
to the machines for dying. Hannah Arendt indicates a way of gaining a
broader perspective when, in the penultimate chapter of The Origins of
Totalitarianism, she writes, “The insane mass manufacture of corpses is
preceded by the historically and politically intelligible preparation of living
corpses” (447). This essay seeks to take seriously Arendt’s suggestion that
mass slaughter is a productive, and not simply a destructive, process, especially her suggestion that those who are destined to be transformed into
corpses need to be produced, from the beginning, as so destined. What I
find interesting about modern industrial agriculture is that it exercises not
just the awesome power to take life but also the perhaps more awesome
power to make life by actively prosecuting birth through the practice of
mass breeding. Agricultural animals are made to live and made to make
live. This is in no way to suggest that the industry makes up for or undoes
what happens in the slaughterhouse. For what is truly interesting is that,
6 To be sure, the discomfort or shock experienced by many people when invited to

think about killing animals in slaughterhouses—even their resistance to thinking
about such killing (and to thinking about their resistance to such thinking)—is
evidence of a sort of surprise. But this just makes our experience of industrialized animal killing a good example of ideological disavowal (“I know very well,
but …”). My point is less about our perception of animal killing than about the
fact that, regardless of our perception of it, it happens.
7 I am deliberately abusing Heidegger’s terms here so as to point out that the
deaths of animal labourers in the modern agricultural industry are not simply
a biological exigency but a biopolitical one.
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as Arendt’s metaphor of “living corpses” indicates, those who are prepared
for slaughter are, prior to slaughter, somehow already dead. That is, the
life that they nevertheless live exists before slaughter but after an earlier
form of death. In the case of industrial agriculture, my argument will be
that before animals are massacred in slaughterhouses, their life is marked
by a form of dying that is indistinguishable from their being born. While
agriculture wants them to be born, it does not want them to live. Once
we take into account the mass breeding of animals as well as their mass
slaughter, industrial agriculture comes into focus as a biopolitical project
in which it becomes as difficult as it is urgent to say exactly when the life
that begins with birth ends in death.

The Work of Birth

Looked at from the point of view of the animals employed at food production facilities, agriculture appears to be little more than a massive
enterprise of killing. The more common-sense point of view, however, is
that the ultimate meaning of animal agriculture is not death but life.8 And
indeed, as the practice of rearing livestock and producing such foodstuffs
as milk and eggs, animal agriculture is an exemplary form of what Arendt,
in The Human Condition, terms “labour,” something to be distinguished
from “work.” Whereas work is activity that engenders the human-made
world of artifacts—cars, buildings, appliances, hydro-electric dams, novels,
jewelry, and so on—labour is an activity that provides for the biological
life of human beings. “Labor,” claims Arendt, “ensures not only individual
survival, but the life of the species” (8); “it never ‘produces’ anything but
life” (88). Given that the vast majority of products that agriculture produces are forms of food, it is, like other forms of labour such as medicine, a
form of activity that quite directly sustains the conditions for life itself. The
American classic rock musician Ted Nugent and his wife Shemane Nugent
put it succinctly in their book Kill It and Grill It: A Guide to Preparing and
8 This is how Elizabeth Costello describes the view of animal agriculture she
critiques in The Lives of Animals:
And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately
devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn
them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and
refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the
comfort of our homes) is as little consolation to those victims as
it would have been—pardon the tastelessness of the following—to
ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body-
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Cooking Wild Game and Fish when they write, “meat is life!” (181).9 Of
course, the syntactic minimalism and copulative certainty of this statement, along with the all capital letters and the exclamation point, try a little
too hard to efface any sense that, as English pop singer Morrissey once
put it, “Meat is murder.”10 And it does have to be admitted that the “life”
that meat “is” is not that of the meat itself or that formerly living creature
which became the “meat.” Nevertheless, even though animal agriculture
necessarily requires killing animals, the meat (and other food) that animals
become once they are dead nourishes, in a very material way, human life.
Of course, it is this very logic by which killing produces life that makes
the animal agricultural industry such a textbook case of what Michel Foucault called the “death-function” of biopolitics (“Society Must Be Defended”
258). In his seminal account of biopolitics in the mid 1970s, Foucault contrasted biopower, the power to “make live,” with sovereign power, “the right
to kill” (241). As Foucault himself well knew, however, if the power to make
live has proven proficient at making anything over the last two centuries,
it is a pretty impressive number of dead bodies. A significant amount of
work within biopolitical theory since Foucault has been preoccupied with
explaining the ways in which the project of making live is also a project
of making die, how biopolitics is also thanatopolitics or necropolitics.11
Foucault’s own elegant explanation is that biopolitical power, in executing its project to make live, first, projects onto the living in general under
its management a hierarchical opposition between two sorts of living
beings: those that must live and those that must die, and second, establishes between them a biologistic notion of sacrifice whereby the killing of
the latter increases the vitality of the former. Once this structure is in place,
acts of making die can contribute to a project of making live because they
are directed at a particular part of the population whose best contribution
to the life of society may very well be dying. Applying this model to the
specific case of animal agriculture is simple. Agriculture’s official objective
is to provide food. As the motto for the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the un says, fiat panis (“let there be bread”). And with the modernizafat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses
with. (22)
9 To be fair to the Nugents, the kind of meat they specify “is” life belongs to wild
animals and not to agricultural animals.
10 “Meat is Murder” is the title of a 1985 album, and a song on that album, by the
band The Smiths, for which Morrissey provided the voice and lyrics.
11 Giorgio Agamben uses the term thanatopolitics in Homo Sacer, while necropolitics comes from Achilles Mbembe’s “Necropolitics.”
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tion of production techniques beginning in the eighteenth century, animal
agriculture has exemplified the biopolitical project of making live in a
remarkably successful way. The production of food for human beings to
eat turns, of course, upon a presupposed opposition between the human
and the animal parts of the population. This opposition might seem given
in the nature of things, merely a function of biological taxonomy. But
without even taking into account the consequences of Jacques Derrida’s
point that the very category of “the animal,” as something to be opposed
to “the human,” is about as unnatural and empirically inaccurate a concept as there ever existed (129–34), it does not take much to see that the
subdivision of all living creatures into two groups is biopolitical precisely
to the extent that it is confused with a distinction between those with a
fundamental right to life and those whose right to life, if they have one, is
every time trumped by that of the former group. To say this might seem
an affront to common sense, but it is merely to restate two assumptions
that subtend agriculture: the decision to externalize the lethal costs of its
activities onto animals and the fantasy of sublation that turns these costs,
via a sacrificial logic, into human life. Like all living creatures, humans
surely have both a need, and, yes, even a right, to eat, and to eat well, but
reducing the living in general to two categories of things, distributing life
and death along that distinction, and then acting as if death can magically turn into life is hardly a necessity. Nor, it must be said, does it seem
particularly just. It is a biopolitical exigency.
To describe animal agriculture as an unambiguous instance of the
death-function of biopolitics, as I have been doing, captures something
that, I think, very few people would bother denying. However, even as it
is not wrong, neither is it wholly satisfactory, for it ignores what is really
interesting about the industry’s management of animal life. Consider that
Foucault grounds his account of the biopolitical justification for taking life
in the example of a racism that hallucinates one part of the population as
not so much an “enemy” as a “threat” to the other (a threat being a menace
but not an adversary) (“Society Must Be Defended” 255–56). No matter how
one looks at them, agricultural animals are not threats to human beings.
The only time in which the latter can feel true is when pathogens amongst
domestic animal populations jump the species boundary and infect human
beings. As Cary Wolfe notes, when zoonotic pathogens, including those
resistant to antibiotics, are seen to “pose a risk to national biosecurity,
the results are depressingly familiar”: for example, “millions of chickens,
turkeys, and ducks killed worldwide—80 million alone in Southeast Asia,
19 million more in Canada—to combat h5n1 avian influenza in the spring
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of 2004” (49). However, what is key here, and what Wolfe does not explicitly point out in his analysis, is that the “depopulation” of animals, as the
official term puts it, aims not at the animals themselves but at the pathogens they carry, diseases which also threaten them, the animals. This is
hardly the logic of the “threat” Foucault talks about, because animals are
strictly speaking only hosts to the real threat to human beings, and the
whole point of emergency “depopulations” is to protect not just human
beings but also the animal population itself. If animals themselves were
biological threats, then we would certainly kill them, but we would not
reproduce them again!
We can further dilate this wrinkle in the application of Foucault’s model
of the death-function of biopolitics. Foucault himself well appreciated
that it is possible for the death-function, once set in motion, to authorize
the massacre of the very population it is supposed to protect. The Nazi
state, for instance, aimed to protect the biological existence of its population more rigorously than any state had before. At the same time, it was
extremely liberal with its exercise of sovereign power’s right to take life,
and not just toward those it deemed non-German, such as Jews, but also,
in the end, toward true-blooded Germans. This possibility was, Foucault
argues, built into the Nazi biopolitical project from the beginning:
The destruction of other races was one aspect of the [Nazi]
project, the other being to expose its own race to the absolute
and universal threat of death.… Exposing the entire population to universal death was the only way it could truly constitute itself as a superior race and bring about its definitive
regeneration once other races has been either exterminated
or enslaved forever.
The Nazi state was, thus, not just “murderous” but also “suicidal,” and the
result was not just the Final Solution but also “Telegram 71, in which, in
April 1945, Hitler gave the order to destroy the German people’s own living
conditions” (“Society Must Be Defended” 259–60).
In terms of the logic authorizing the exercise of the right to kill, the
main difference between what happened in Nazi Germany and modern
animal agriculture is that whereas Nazism tried to make the German
people live by killing Jews, only to end up trying to kill the German people,
agriculture undertakes to make human beings live by killing animals but,
in order to do so, puts a lot of effort into making animals live. Not only
are agricultural animals not threats to be exterminated; they are, in the
practice of husbandry, actively bred into existence. As much as the agri104 | Hunt

cultural industry makes animals die, it also makes them live, and literally so, by breeding them, the very population that it also kills. Just as
animals employed in the agricultural industry do not simply die, but are
systematically killed, so we must say that they are not simply born, but
are systematically bred. That is to say, neither cattle nor pigs nor poultry
reproduce in a way that could fairly be described as spontaneous. Ever
since animals were domesticated some twelve thousand years ago—and
the first domesticated species was the dog—their reproduction can be said
to have been influenced by human beings, even if unintentionally. Over
the last two hundred years or so, as I will detail shortly, human regulation
of animal sexual reproduction has become much more controlled and
consequential to the point that agricultural practices regulate the births
of animals as efficiently as their dying. Agriculture is as much an exercise
in the highly organized mass breeding of animals as it is an exercise in the
highly organized mass killing of animals. If industrial agriculture were simply a thanatopolitical exercise in the mass killing of animals for the benefit
of humans, it would be a short-lived enterprise. Modern slaughterhouses,
with their high capacity, high efficiency kill rates, would make short work
of all existing agricultural animals. Out of necessity, if nothing else, the
agricultural industry must be, for want of a better word, pro-life, and the
life it sustains, cares for, and fosters is not just human but also animal. Ted
Nugent, yet again, expresses the point in his paradox-accentuating clipped
style with some ironic advice to environmentalists concerned about the
extinction of wild animal species: “If you want to save a species, simply
decide to eat it. Then it will be managed—like chickens, like turkeys, like
deer, like Canadian geese” (“I have the American Dream licked”). The
agricultural industry’s logic is, we could say, the reverse: because it wants
to kill animals, and so produce the food that sustains human life, it has to
call animals into existence. The result, however, is the same. Every animal
labourer the industry kills is one it has already bred. And for every one it
kills, it breeds another.
In fact, it is more accurate to say that for every animal it kills, the industry breeds more than one new animal. Take poultry, which are globally the
most populous type of domesticated animal. In 1961 the world domesticated chicken population was almost four billion. Now it is nineteen
billion. The dramatic increase at a rate that is historically unprecedented
is not unrelated, of course, to a similar increase in the human population over the same period, from just over three billion to almost seven
billion. Yet as these numbers indicate, the agricultural animal population is not just far greater than the human population; it is growing at a
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rate considerably larger than that of the human population. By the year
2050, moreover, the human population is projected to increase to over
nine billion. In that same period the global demand for meat and dairy
products is projected to double largely because of the westernization of
diets in so-called developing countries. The increase in the agricultural
animal population this necessitates—largely thanks to the introduction
of industrialized factory farm production techniques into said nations—
will far outstrip the increase of the global human population. In sum, the
already vast population of animals managed by the industrial agricultural
industry is growing vaster at a rate that is itself accelerating (“Counting
Chickens”). Insofar as the reproduction of agricultural animals through
birth is regulated in such a way that, over time, more animals are born
than are killed, we can say that industrial animal agriculture is, even as
regards the animals themselves that it kills, more a project of making live
than it is a project of making die.
Such a situation constitutes, I suggest, an oddity for accounts of the
death-function of biopolitics offered by Foucault and theorists who have
followed him. Consider that Roberto Esposito opens Bios: Biopolitics and
Philosophy with five examples, drawn from the contemporary period, of
the “double tendency” of power to simultaneously, in the same gesture,
to make live and to kill. “It is,” he writes, “exactly the same paradox that
Michel Foucault, in a series of writings dating back to the middle of the
1970s, examined. Why does a politics of life always risk being reversed
into a work of death?” (7–8). We will return to one of Esposito’s examples
of this paradox below, but for now I think we can see that insofar as the
mass breeding of animals is a constitutive feature of industrial agriculture,
then what the husbandry-slaughtering complex presents is a paradox that
is a bit more complicated than that which Esposito identifies. For while
agriculture is undoubtedly a politics of life that proceeds as a work of death,
it also proceeds as what we can call a work of birth. And as we shall see,
the real perplexity lies in the fact that the work of birth and the work of
death are indistinguishable.

The Death of Birth

To examine the work of birth as organized by the husbandry industry,
let’s think briefly about the relation between birth and death structuring
the predicament of animal species that face extinction. It is well known
that agricultural production is one of the leading causes of environmental degradation. According to the widely read 2010 report by the United
Nations Environmental Programme, Assessing the Environmental Impacts
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of Production and Consumption, “Agricultural production accounts for
a staggering 70% of the global freshwater consumption, 38% of the total
land use, and 14% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions” (2). The same
study also highlights the particular impact of animal agriculture, which, no
matter how industrialized, “is and will remain an inefficient transformation process compared to most industrial processes”: “Animal products,
both meat and dairy, in general require more resources and cause higher
emissions than plant-based alternatives.” Looking to the future, it says, “A
substantial reduction of impacts would only be possible with a substantial
worldwide diet change, away from animal products” (75, 79, 82). Another
fact, one hidden in even such statements, emerges when we frame the
environmental impact of animal agriculture in terms of animal population
sizes: the extraordinary expansion, over the last decades, of the size of
already vast standing agricultural animal populations has produced a corresponding decrease in wild animal populations. According to the World
Wildlife Fund’s 2012 Living Planet Index Report, between 1970 and 2008,
exactly the same period over which the global agricultural animal population began to boom, the world’s non-domesticated animal populations,
including birds and fish, declined by an average of 30 percent. In many
cases entire species have already gone extinct or face imminent extinction. Many biologists agree that we are living through the sixth great mass
extinction of life forms in the history of the planet and that many of these
extinctions that have occurred in the last two hundred years are directly
or indirectly, and even if unintentionally, anthropogenic. In his 2002 book
The Future of Life, E. O. Wilson, the biologist well known equally for his
inventing sociobiology and for his vigorous environmentalism, posited
that if the current rate of biodiversity loss continues unabated, one half
of the planet’s higher life forms will be extinct by 2100 (23).
Beyond rehearsing what everyone already knows about the loss of biodiversity, however, I want to see what we can learn from one phrase sometimes used to describe species extinction: “the death of birth,” a phrase
widely said to originate with Wilson, although I have not been able to
track it down in his writings—something perhaps appropriate given that
the phrase signifies effacement of origins.12 In the popular 2003 documentary The Corporation, ceo-turned-ecologist Ray Anderson recounts
his experience of being struck by the phrase while reading Paul Hawken’s
The Ecology of Commerce: “very quickly into that book I found the phrase,
12 A similar phrase appears in Michael Soulé and Brian Wilcox’s Conservation
Biology: An Evolutionary-Ecological Perspective: “Death is one thing. An end
of birth is something else” (8).
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‘the death of birth.’ It was E. O. Wilson’s expression for species extinction,
‘the death of birth,’ and it was a point of a spear into my chest, and I read
on, and the spear went deeper, and it became an epiphanal experience,
a total change of mindset for myself and a change of paradigm” (37). As
Anderson’s account of reading suggests, “the death of birth” has a painful
poignancy that “species extinction” does not. I encountered this myself
when, during a lecture Wilson gave on biodiversity at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison in January 2006, I, too, had a near-death reading
experience. Projecting a colour photograph of a male golden toad (Bufo
periglenes), a member of a species indigenous to high-altitude tropical
forests in Costa Rica, he explained that the last time a living specimen of
this species was seen was in on 15 May 1989, and the species has since been
declared extinct by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. I
remember being sharply moved, as if physically punched, when he called
species extinction “the death of birth” and explained that not only is this
particular toad dead, but no more individuals of this species will ever be
born in the future.
The pathos that colours attempts to read “the death of birth” registers
the way the phrase describes species extinction not as an empirical phenomenon but as an ontological event. A species is often said to become
extinct when the last member of that species, the one who has survived
the deaths of all conspecifics, dies. Through a synecdochal identification
of part and whole, the death of the specimen is the death of the population. And indeed, there can be something deeply poignant about images
of the last surviving individuals, such as the famous black-and-white film
footage, shot in 1933, of the last Tasmanian Tiger, aimlessly pacing back
and forth in a cage. But what is any such last surviving individual really a
specimen of? If from the moment it is the last, can its singular existence
be said, in all rigour, to have the exemplarity of a specimen of a species?
The concept of a species as a population that can successfully reproduce,
dominant since biologist Ernst Mayr’s formulation, suggests that a species
actually becomes extinct when a population is no longer reproductively
viable: not when a death, the last death, happens, but when birth does
not happen, is no longer able to happen. Species extinction is less about
death happening than it is about birth not happening, or not happening
as much as death happens. Indeed, whatever the particular circumstances
and causal factors at work, a species goes extinct when its birthrate is less
than its mortality rate. As Children of Men-type scenarios demonstrate, it
is possible for a species to go extinct without any increase in the mortality
rate, even without any killing, as opposed to dying, taking place. Hence
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biologists refer to species where several members are still alive but are,
for various reasons, incapable of reproducing, as “functionally extinct”
(Wilson 37). What renders “the death of birth” a conceit, or extravagant
figure of speech, worthy of the renaissance English metaphysical poets, is
that it precisely emphasizes that a species goes extinct not when the last
individual member of that species departs the world by dying but when
the act of entering into the world by birth itself departs the world. Collapsing the distance separating the modes by which mortals enter into the
world and depart from it, it sends the light of natality into the darkness of
mortality, thus closing the openness of coming-into-being. The paradox
is so sharp because what comes to an end is not just a thing but the generative iterability that makes this thing possible in the first place. It is not
that the species disappears but that its mode of appearance disappears,
not that something ends but that what ends is beginning itself, not that
life dies but that birth dies.

Making Live

If endangered animal species face the ontological predicament of the
death of birth, then how do we describe the predicament faced by animal
populations held in agricultural production facilities? The answer lies in
what we can call the “birth-function” of biopolitics. While species facing
extinction have no future, this is a problem that agricultural animals will
never face, so long as something like current conditions of production persist. Indeed, their problem is that they have a guaranteed future, perhaps
too much future. Clearly this is not because of enforced legal or normative interdictions on killing individual agricultural animals. Members of
non-agricultural threatened species are (at least in theory) so protected,
but the killing of agricultural animals is, as we have seen, an efficiently
organized affair that happens on a massive scale: domesticated cows, pigs,
and poultry die in numbers that easily outstrip, indeed dwarf, those of any
threatened species. (Which makes one ask: Are agricultural animals not
also “threatened”?) If agricultural animals have, nevertheless, such a certain future, it is because it is not just their deaths but also their births that
are subject to careful biopolitical management. In fact, we could say that
animal agriculture turns two important features of the ontology of living
creatures to its advantage. On the one hand—and this is easy to grasp—it
recognizes that that cows, pigs, and poultry, like all mortal creatures, leave
the world by dying and can be made to die. Exploiting this fact, it kills
them in great numbers. But it also knows full well that animals, like all
natal creatures, enter the world by being born and can be made to be born.
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Exploiting this fact, it breeds animals in numbers at least equally great.
After all, the world’s most effective animal breeding programs are found
not in the field of wildlife conservation but in the agricultural industry.
This is odd to think, given that the animals bred are also the ones killed,
but such breeding programs are, nevertheless, so well funded and so successful that conservationist groups working to save dwindling populations
of wild animal species can only marvel.
It is at this point that we need to pay attention to an unremarked upon
double meaning audible within Foucault’s description of biopower’s basic
operation as the power to “make live” (faire vivre). To “make live” can
mean to allow, enable, or empower to live, where the action of making
organizes the conditions of possibility for living, all the while preserving
the activity of the one who actually does the living. However, to “make live”
can also be more coercive. To make live can have the effect of compelling
or forcing the living to live. I think much work within biopolitical studies,
that concerned with normalization, interprets this coerciveness to mean
that power often makes human beings live in certain ways, according to
particular models or standards. More radically, however, to make live in
a coercive sense can also take the form of making something be alive in
the first place, by being born.13 The practice of breeding that goes on in
the wing of industrial agriculture known as husbandry is an example of
the biopolitical project of making live in the latter sense. Manipulating
reproductive capacities possessed by all living creatures, it refuses agricultural animals the option to not be made to live.
Animal husbandry turns birth into a function of the biopolitical project
to make live in two ways, for it makes animals make other animals live
and it makes animals live. The first form of making live is most apparent
in the way in which the process of conception is, in the case of many agricultural animal species, so completely managed by technical interventions
that animals themselves are not required, not permitted, or not able to
sexually copulate. For most of the twelve-thousand-odd year history of
animal domestication by human beings, any human influence on animal
reproduction was slight and mostly unintentional. However, beginning
with the modern Agricultural Revolution human beings have mediated
the reproduction of animals in increasingly hands-on ways. In the 1760s
Robert Blakewell of Dishley Farm in Leicester conducted influential
experiments in selective breeding with sheep, cattle, and horses, most
13 Foucault notes a similar ambiguity in the death-function of biopolitics: “When I

say ‘killing’ [as in “the right to kill”], I obviously do not mean simply murder as
such, but also every indirect form of murder” (“Society Must Be Defended” 256).
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notably in inbreeding (reproductive copulation within the same family)
so as to increase the chances that offspring would inherit desired traits,
in the case of cattle this being size, form, flesh, and fattening propensity
(Carlson). While such recognizably modern husbandry practices transformed the existence of animals as living creatures, they did, nonetheless,
require animals to copulate in order to conceive. With the development
of assisted reproduction technologies (arts) in the first half of twentieth
century, however, the impregnation of female animals became possible
without copulation. The rationalization of conception through arts was
first achieved on a truly mass scale in the cattle industry in the United
States during the 1970s. Ever since that time the conception of a dairy calf
can involve a number of stages:
1. the collection of semen from a carefully chosen breeding bull by
means of a manually operated “artificial vagina” or by inserting electrodes in a bull’s rectum to stimulate ejaculation;
2. the extension, sex identification, and sorting of the semen;
3. cryogenic freezing, and storage of the semen in semen tanks;
4. the transportation of the semen via networks capable of stretching
across nations, regions, and the globe;
5. the thawing of the semen and artificial insemination of a cow of high
genetic quality, in natural or artificially induced estrus, by means of a
needleless syringe;
6. the hormonally induced multiplication of eggs (superovulation) in
cows;
7. the flushing of the embryos from the cow;
8. the cryogenic freezing the embryos;
9. and the transfer of the embryos into the recipient herd of lower
genetic quality in synchronized estrus—two embryos for each to
enable twinning.14
As is clear, the reproductive capacities of all animals involved is rationalized for efficiency. Without arts a bull can cover thirty to fifty cows per
year. With the use of arts, the number of calves one bull can produce is
fifty thousand (Clarke 160). Transfer of embryos to the herd of cows allows
the high-quality cow to be re-impregnated again as soon as is desired and
14 Adele E. Clarke discusses developments in the theory and practice of reproduction in the agricultural sciences and industry in Disciplining Reproduction: Modernity, American Life Sciences, and “the Problem of Sex” (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1998), 159–62.
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practical. “As in any other area of Fordist manufacture,” Melinda Cooper
notes in Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal
Era, “the aim of these procedures is to increase the production of relative surplus value (in milk and meat) by getting the most out of each unit
time of reproductive labor. In line with the standard rules of assembly line
production, animal reproductive science seeks to eliminate unproductive
(or rather unreproductive) time,” the result being that “reproduction is
reduced to production” (132–33).15
It does not feel right to say that such assisted reproductive techniques
require human beings to have coercive sex with animals or that modern
agricultural husbandry amounts to a program of mass rape by proxy. However, it is remarkably suggestive that such techniques also do not require
animals to physically copulate with each other and that any erotic pleasure necessary to get a bull to ejaculate into an artificial vagina is entirely
co-ordinated by human beings. Indeed, in many cases the morphological
oddities breeding techniques introduce render animals physically incapable of successfully copulating. Given that one of the things the American Christian pro-life movement laments is sex without reproduction, it
would be logical to think that the reproduction without sex involved in the
artificial reproduction of agricultural animal life can, for them, only be a
wet dream. Surely, at this point the difference between violently fucking
animals and radically invasive forms of fucking with their fucking becomes
a real question.
Breeding is, of course, a process directed at bringing more animals
into existence. If the use of these breeding techniques to force animals to
conceive is a first step in the process of making live, a final step is forcing
animals to be born.16 The term “forced birth” has been used to describe
a practice of compelling pregnant women to bring a fetus to term and
deliver it. Forced birth can, for instance, describe the effects of pro-life
15 The most recent development in agricultural husbandry is the combination

of arts with techniques of selective breeding oriented by molecular biotechnologies of marker-assisted selection, genomic selection, transgenics (genetic
modification), and cloning, although the mass implementation of such new
technologies is unevenly developed across cattle, pigs, poultry, and other species. For an in-depth discussion, see Richard Twine, Animals as Biotechnology.
16 Technically such animals as poultry and fish are hatched, not born. However,
described from a biopolitical, as opposed to a purely physiological, point of view,
differences between viviparous and oviparous ways of entering the world are
less important. In what follows, I will, purely for stylistic purposes, use “birth”
to refer to both parturition and the process of laying of fertilized eggs that then
develop and hatch outside the body.
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movements on women’s reproductive rights. Whether a woman becomes
pregnant freely or forcibly, anti-abortion laws and norms can prevent her
from securing an abortion even when she does not freely choose to give
birth.17 I do not think that it detracts from our appreciation of the very real
violence to which women are subjected to consider that “forced birth” also
describes the manner in which female animals in the agricultural industry
have no option but to perform the labour of birth necessary to bring other
animals into existence. At the moment of this labour, such animals are
made to make live. And more than this, the violence implicit in the phrase
“forced birth” can also be directed toward those whom the birth makes live,
namely, the animals who are born. While Penelope Deutscher points out
that treatments of reproductive politics in biopolitical theory focus, for
no good reason, on “fetal life” while ignoring “reproductive maternal life,”
I do want to suggest that agricultural husbandry practices deny animals
not just the option to give birth but also the option to not be born.
Of course, in saying that industrialized agriculture forces living creatures to be born might seem to put the horse before the cart, or—perhaps
more precisely—to put the horse before the horse, in the sense that it
would seem to assume that an animal exists before it exists. This is one of
Esposito’s criticisms of the French Appeals Court’s decision to recognize
the right of a baby named Nicolas, born with serious genetic lesions, to
sue the doctor who misdiagnosed a case of German measles in his pregnant mother.
What appears to be the legally irresolvable object of controversy in the entire incident is attributing to small Nicolas the
right not to be born.… The difficulty is both of a logical and an
ontological order. If it is also already problematic that a being
can invoke his or her right not to be, it is even more difficult to
think of a nonbeing (which is precisely who has not yet been
born) that claims the right to remain as such, and therefore
not to enter into the sphere of being. (3)
17 After several Republican Party candidates in the United States who during the

2012 election cycle publically asserted that women do not have a right to an
abortion, even in the case of rape, comedian Jon Stewart responded by summing up the logic at work in such statements: “If a women wants to have a child
through ivf, she cannot. If she does not want to have a baby conceived during
rape, she has to.” His comments explicitly characterize the pro-life position as
a second form of coercion continuous with that of rape. For our purposes, they
also highlight the fact that animals who do not expressly signal their desire to
have offspring are, nonetheless, forced, through arts, to have them.
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In the case of animal agriculture, saying that something that does not
exist is forced to exist is indeed a contradiction in terms. And yet it is
surely a cop-out to say that animals who have not yet been born (or even
conceived) cannot have anything done to them, including be made to be
born. The question is political, not strictly metaphysical, and it is undecidable if any subject pre-exists its subjection to a power to make live, for,
as Judith Butler argues, the interpellative address of power is directed to
subjects even as it calls them into life (2). Recognizing the ontological
ambivalence of a referent that is the effect, and not simply the source, of
the structure of reference allows us to see that subjection is productive
of the subject, without effacing all the ways in which power is also, in the
same gesture, deductive or subtractive. This holds, I suggest, even when
the effect of power’s ambivalent interpellation is making live in the sense
of forcing something to be born. Consider Adam’s apostrophe to God in
John Milton’s Paradise Lost, famously excerpted by Mary Shelley on the
title page of her novel Frankenstein: “Did I request thee, Maker, from my
clay / To mould me Man, did I solicit thee / From darkness to promote
me?” (x 743–45). Here Adam addresses to God a rhetorical question about
if, before he was created, he addressed to God an appeal to be created. In
all the prenatal activity by which agricultural husbandry industry, like any
expectant author of population policy, prepares for the arrival of newborns,
it simultaneously recognizes and denies that it is similarly addressed by
animals. Indeed, all its prenatal preparations effectively say to animals
who have not been born, “You may not not be born.”
Let me be clear that, in and of itself, this point has nothing to do with
the welfare concerns over the quality of life made available to animals.
Animals labouring for the agricultural industry are certainly forced to live
in some pretty unpleasant places. Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (cafos), for instance, force large numbers of animals—say, seven
hundred or more dairy cows, one hundred and twenty-five thousand or
more laying hens—in such inventively inhospitable conditions that we
should not hesitate to call such life a “slow death,” Lauren Berlant’s term
for a condition in which being worn out and living are indistinguishable. In
addition, many animals, thrown by the powerful hand of biotechnological
manipulation such as growth hormones, hurtle toward death at an accelerated rate, one far beyond that of their domesticated ancestors or their wild
species peers. For example, the lifespan of broiler chickens is standardized
for maximum efficiency to six weeks, at which point, having reached what
is called their “slaughter weight,” any more life would be surplus to the
labour the industry requires them to perform. But both unsavoury living
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conditions and not having enough life can characterize the existence of
creatures only once they are alive. More fundamentally, animal labourers
are, through mass breeding, made to live in the first place.

Birth Kills

The account of the mass breeding practices of modern agriculture I have
been offering up to this point has served to contest the assumption, widespread in the field of animal studies, that, as the introduction to the appositely titled essay collection Killing Animals puts it, killing is the “most
extreme” and “ultimate expression of human power over animals” (4).
However, the point of doing this has been to prepare us to deepen our
appreciation of the genius with which the agricultural industry massacres
animals. What happens in slaughterhouses is, to invoke Arendt’s phrasing, “the insane manufacture of corpses,” but this does not mean that what
happens in husbandry practices is the opposite, the reasonable calling of
living creatures into life. Rather, husbandry’s management of birth makes
live creatures that will be killed because they are born already dead. Agriculture might say, “You may not not be born,” but that does not amount to
saying, “You may live.” For husbandry inscribes onto the births of animals
a death that anticipates their being killed in slaughterhouses.
In order to draw toward this conclusion, I want to offer a reading of
an event that echoes the futile stories of animal escapes with which I
began but this time in the explicit context of sovereignty and the law. Just
before American Thanksgiving each year the National Turkey Federation
of the United States presents a live turkey to the White House.18 The tradition began in 1947, but at the presentation ceremony in 1989, George
H. W. Bush did something new, something that all presidents ever since
have followed suit in doing: he granted the turkey a presidential pardon.
The pardoned turkeys have been permitted to live out the rest of their
unnatural born lives at a number of places: first the unfortunately named
agricultural park Frying Pan Park, then from 2005 to 2009 either Disneyland or Disney World, and since 2010 Mount Washington, George
Washington’s Virginia home.
Staged before the national news media, this encounter between the
beast and the sovereign, which has become known as the Presidential
Turkey Pardon, is a piece of public relations theater performed in the
style of a black comedy. The following quip by Barack Obama in 2009 is
18 Unofficially, two turkeys are presented, one being the official offering, the second
being the understudy on hand in case the first gets sick or, as has happened,
dies before the event.
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a good example of what I mean: “Thanks to the intervention of Malia and
Sasha [his children]—because I was ready to eat this sucker—Courage [the
name given to the turkey] will … be spared this terrible and delicious fate”
(Slack). Here is an example of the gallows humour with which George
W. Bush peppered his speech at the ceremony in 2005: “This is what we
call—the White House is called the people’s house, and we’re going to call
Marshmallow and Yam the people’s turkeys. They made it here through a
democratic process. There was a nationwide election on the White House
web site. In the end, the voters made the choice, and it was a close election.
You might say it was neck and neck.”
One way of explaining what gives the humour of the Presidential Turkey Pardon its dark quality is the oblique evocation of the annual mass
slaughter of turkeys that the president does not pardon—some forty-five
million turkeys in the United States for Thanksgiving, according to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Remember that the group that presents
the turkey to the White House each year, the National Turkey Federation,
is not, as its name might reasonably suggest, an organization representing
the interests of turkeys. It is, as its website, www.eatturkey.com, puts it, a
Washington, D.C.–based lobby group “providing services and conducting
activities which increase demand for its members’ products”—its members being businesses who breed, raise, and slaughter turkeys for profit.
Moreover, up until 1989, the turkeys presented each year to the White
House were never pardoned and almost always served up for dinner a
few days later.
The performance of the Turkey Pardon in the genre of black comedy
can also be explained as a function of the ambivalence of the act of pardoning. To receive a pardon is, for the one being pardoned, undoubtedly a
good thing. However, as an exemplary speech act of sovereignty, a pardon
mobilizes the sovereign’s defining “right to kill.” In his performance of the
role of the forgiving sovereign President Obama attributes his decision to
save Courage the turkey to his daughters, thus deftly fulfilling the imperative that the president be masculine, adult, and carnivorous, a supreme
example of what Derrida calls the “carno-phallogo-centric” subject (“Eating Well”). Perhaps the best demonstration that the sovereign’s power to
pardon, and thus allow to live, co-exists with a right to kill is a photograph
showing President Gerald Ford standing over two turkeys placed side by
side on a table, one living, the other dead.19 Whereas in a declaration of
19 That the photograph is from the period when turkeys presented to the White
House were not pardoned does not take away from the point here.
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a state of exception, the total situation of law is suspended, a pardon suspends only its application on one thing. Nevertheless, the pardon is also
an example of the sovereign’s ability to suspend law.
But the real source of the wrinkle that occasions the near absurdist
dark humour of the Presidential Turkey Pardon, and the true oddness
of the kind of pardon being offered, emerges only once we ask, What is
the turkey being pardoned for? After all, to pardon is to forgive someone
who has committed a crime and to annul the punishment that goes along
with conviction. But in this case, everyone knows that no turkey, even the
lucky one presented to the president, has committed or could commit a
criminal action that we could forgive. Nevertheless, with one exception,
turkeys are subject to the annual violence of systematic mass killing. If the
mass slaughter of turkeys has no relation to anything that they have done,
then the unavoidable conclusion is that it can only be a figural reflection
of what they, like all agricultural animals, are.
What these animals are is, moreover, outside the law in the sense that
they are fundamentally rightless. In The Origins of Totalitarianism Hannah
Arendt says of those she calls “the rightless,” “Their plight is not that they
are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they
are oppressed but that nobody wants to even oppress them” (295–96). To say
that no law exists for agricultural animals might seem like an exaggeration.
Are there not a number of laws that protect the lives of animals? While
welfare laws do indeed exist, they are not only radically inconsistent, as
Siobhan O’Sullivan has handsomely demonstrated, and even absent where
most needed—in the United States agricultural animals are not among the
animals protected by the Federal Animal Welfare Act—they do not, strictly
speaking, exist for animals as subjects of legal rights. The obligation to obey
animal welfare laws is owed to the state, not to animals. This is why animals
do not have standing in the eyes of law, because the law does not recognize
animals can be injured by any actions or laws. The position of animals with
regard to the law is underscored when we considered whether or not, in
their case, it is true, as Arendt says, “The best criterion by which to decide
whether someone has been forced outside the pale of the law is to ask if
he would benefit by committing a crime.… As criminal even a stateless
person will not be treated worse than another criminal, that is, he will be
treated like everybody else. Only as an offender against the law can he
gain protection from it” (Origins 286). The fact that creatures whose mere
existence is grounds for being killed, far from being assigned a lawyer to
represent them in a court, where the accusation about ontology must be
proven, is instead executed without a trial—indeed the fact that the whole
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Presidential Turkey Pardon is a sham cannot be explained by saying that
turkeys are by nature incapable of being recognized as persons before the
law. Rather it demonstrates that turkeys, like all animals, are an example
of what Foucault calls the “biocriminal” (“Society Must Be Defended” 258).
How, he asks, does one justify capital punishment within a governmental
paradigm where life is a fundamental value to be fostered? The answer is
to “invoke less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the
criminal, his incorrigibility, and the safeguard of society. One had the right
to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others” (History
of Sexuality 138). I have met some pretty nasty turkeys, but no one justifies
killing them, or any agricultural animals, by appealing to their threatening
nature. This does not mean, however, that we do not appeal to what they
irremissibly, irredeemably are. As Cary Wolfe points out, the mass killing
of animals is not genocide, in part because it does not aim to eliminate a
group of living beings of a certain “biological constitution” (45). Rather,
it happens for economic reasons. As Wolfe well understands, however,
what happens to animals happens because their biological constitution is
rendered as a death sentence.
This is to say that its birth is a death sentence. The pardoned turkey’s
crime is—along with all other turkeys—nothing more and nothing less
than being born a turkey. In our earlier consideration of the phrase “the
death of birth,” we read birth as that which dies. However, as with all
genitive phrases, the subject and object can be reversed so as to read it as
signifying that birth is something that kills. The death of birth means not
just death over birth but also death by birth. How is this possible? Consider
that the reproductivity of the maternal body, particularly the moment of
birth, is central to the human rights imaginary. As the first article of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, “All human beings are born
and remain equal in dignity and rights” (emphasis added). Industrial agriculture also treats animals as if they are born with an ethical or political
significance. It is, however, an inverse one, for it breeds animals in such a
way that they are born symbolically dead, equal in absolute rightlessness
by which they bear the being killed as a birth right—a right to be killed
possessed by humans. It is, after all, almost certain that the life animals
begin by being bred will end by being killed. At least within the fantasy
world of biopolitics, history, in the sense of contingency, has ended for
such animals; they live in the time that remains. Hence, their birth is best
thought of, not as a presencing but as an absencing or, more accurately,
as a presencing that absents, as an arrival in the form of a departure, an
addition that achieves a subtraction or a loss. In The Fall of Hyperion
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John Keats compared the mortal Apollo’s rebirth as the god of poetry to
a moment when
		
one who should take leave
Of pale immortal death, and with a pang
As hot as death’s is chill, with fierce convulse
Die into life (iii 127–30)
Agricultural animals are, by contrast, those who are born into death. Not
just born for death, as all mortals are, but born in such a way that the result
is not life, but death. To put it sharply, industrialized agriculture organizes
the births of animals in such a way as to make them a form of dying.
Let me conclude by turning to a passage that I suspect many readers
may have had in mind while reading this essay. In The Animal That Therefore I Am Derrida observes that in agriculture and elsewhere animal life
is being destroyed on such a massive scale that it calls to be regarded as
genocide. Yet he also says that the massacre of animal life, if it is a genocide,
would be an odd kind of genocide:
[T]he annihilation of certain species is indeed in process, but
it is occurring through the organization and exploitation of
an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival, in conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous,
outside of every presumed norm of a life proper to animals that
are thus exterminated by means of their continued existence or
overpopulation. As if, for example, instead of throwing a people into ovens and gas chambers (let’s say Nazi) doctors and
geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and
overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of
artificial insemination, so that, being continually more numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing
numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of genetic
experimentation, or extermination by gas or fire. In the same
abattoirs. (The Animal 26)
The first reason why the mass killing of animals does not look like genocide
is that, as Cary Wolfe emphasizes in his reading of this passage, the acts of
killing cannot amount to an extermination, because the acts of breeding
that accompany them make the job of killing an infinite one. Extermination
is just not extermination if it is deliberately interminable (45).20 The second
20 Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello also voices the point about interminability: “Let

me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty,
and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed
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reason, one that evokes the argument I have been making, is that animals
are killed not just through traditional means, such as slaughterhouses, but
through the inventive one of a systematic program of breeding. I think
Derrida overstates the case a bit when he implies that agriculture breeds
animals “so that” it can kill them. Could one also not say it kills them so
that it can breed them? The real point, and one that I think his hyperbole
is calculated to make, is that in such circumstances it is incredibly difficult
to distinguish an act of giving life from an act taking life. In this respect,
agriculture would amount to an unusual program of genocide by forced
birth. “Whereas the Nazis and all their imitators carried out genocide
by preemptively destroying birth,” writes Esposito, “those of today do so
through forced birth” (7).21 For instance, the rape of Tutsi women and
girls by Hutu men and boys was intended to issue in children who were
Hutu. Thus the Tutsi, whose lives were, from the point of view of the
Hutu, not worth living, would be bred out of existence and replaced by
Hutu children whose lives were worth living. The forced birth in animal
agriculture is different, not just insofar as it does not involve any crossing
of different populations but more importantly insofar as it is not intended
to produce offspring whose lives are, unlike their mothers, worthy of living. It is intended to produce living creatures whose lives are, exactly like
their mothers, unworthy of living. Thus it is different from both Nazi and
Hutu genocidal rape, which attempt to make live through the death of
the certain parts of the population. In animal agriculture making live and
making die converge in a more acute way, for these projects are exercised
on the same population. As a spokesman for the Disney Company, at
whose parks the turkeys pardoned by presidents between 2005 and 2009
were sent to live, said in explaining why the turkeys died so quickly after
arriving, “They’re not bred to live a long time. These turkeys are bred for
Thanksgiving” (Greenwood).

dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing
rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of
killing them” (22).
21 Catherine Mackinnon notes that the same strategy was also pursued in BosniaHerzegovinia. In an unnerving present tense, she writes, “In genocide, it is
more usual for the babies on the other side to be killed. Croatian and Muslim
women are raped, and then denied abortions, to help make a Serbian state by
making Serbian babies” (191).
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